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Using nationally representative data in China, we find substantial positive partial correlations 
of both parents’ education with one’s wage. In addition, returns to father’s education are 
higher in more monopsonistic and less meritocratic labor markets, including non-coastal 
regions, the state-owned sector, and the early periods of the reform era. The opposite is, 
however, true with respect to mother’s education. Overall, the empirical evidence is 
consistent with the story that father’s education mainly indicates family connections useful for 
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1 Introduction 
In the vast empirical literature of earnings determination, researchers typically find 
the education level of one’s father or mother to be positive and significant when included 
(see literature review in the next section). Therefore, parental education either serves as a 
proxy for children’s unobserved human capital, or represents something unrelated to 
productivity, but nonetheless rewarded in the labor market, such as labor market nepotism 
(Lam and Schoeni, 1993, 1994; Kramarz and Skans, 2007). To date, the existing literature 
as a whole has not paid enough attention to differentiating the two possible channels. 
Nevertheless, it is important to do so both to understand how labor market works in general 
and how human capital and earnings are transmitted across generations in particular (Piketty, 
1998; Solon, 1999; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; and Nathan and Mulligan, 2002, Becker and 
Tomes, 1979, 1986). 
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between parents’ education and children’s 
wages using data from China. The Chinese society is traditionally paternalistic, thus one 
might expect parental characteristics to affect children’s outcomes strongly. Furthermore, 
Chinese labor markets have experienced tremendous changes during the last several decades, 
moving from a fragmented, rigid system to market-based wage-setting institutions with 
increased labor mobility. In addition, developments across different geographic regions and 
employment sectors remain imbalanced. Thus, China's recent experience presents rich 
variations upon which to compare the impacts of parental education on children’s wages. 
Our empirical work is based upon two nationally representative data sets: the 2007 4 
 
supplement of Urban Household Survey from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and 
the 2002 wave of China Household Income Project (CHIP). We find substantial positive 
partial correlations of parental education with one’s wages. In addition, returns to father’s 
education are higher in more monopsonistic and less meritocratic labor markets, including 
non-coastal regions, the state sector, and early periods of the reform era. In contrast, wage 
returns to mother’s education are higher in more developed labor markets. 
Using a simple model of earnings generation, we interpret our results as suggesting 
quite different roles for mother’s and father’s schooling - while mother’s education 
primarily serves as a proxy for unmeasured ability
1, father’s education stands for family 
connections useful in finding a good first job. This interpretation is consistent with the broad 
literature of child development and the pervasive role of family connections in the Chinese 
society
2. As fathers are usually the “heads” of families who determine the families’ social 
economic status, paternal characteristics are more correlated with labor market nepotism 
than maternal ones. On the other hand, mothers’ educations are probably more correlated 
with children’s ability than fathers’, as mothers typically play a more important role in 
parenting and spend more time with their children
3. 
                                                 
1 For example, Altonji and Dunn (1996) show that mothers’ education is positively 
correlated with children’s return to education but father’s education is not. 
2 See Bian (1994), Zhang and Li (2003), and Knight and Yueh (2008) for studies on the 
role of social connection, or “guanxi”, in Chinese society and economy. 
3 The literature in general finds a strong effect of parental time with children on child 
development (see Leibowitz, 1977; Datcher-loury, 1988; and Ruhm, forthcoming). Price 
(2008) shows that fathers spend considerably less amount of quality time with their children. 
than mothers do, using American Time Use Survey data. Smith (1989) concludes that 
mothers and fathers influence their children’s academic performance and educational goals 
through different mechanisms. Paternal influence is largely dependent upon father’s 5 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the related 
literature. Section three provides a brief background introduction of institutional changes in 
China during the past several decades. Section four develops testable hypotheses based on a 
model of earnings generation. Section five describes the data sets. This is followed by 
empirical results in section six. The last section concludes with a comparison of our 
theoretical predictions with empirical findings. 
2 Literature Review   
Many Mincer-type regressions of earnings function include some parental 
characteristics such as their levels of education (Schultz, 1988). However, most of the times, 
it is motivated by concerns over the possible omitted variable bias on estimates of returns to 
schooling
4, rather than interests in parental-children relationship itself. Those studies 
usually find parental education to be positively associated with one’s wages even 
controlling for other factors such as the schooling level of herself. 
In the United States, Featherman and Houser (1978) find that family background 
variables have an important effect on early earnings but that such effects weaken over the life 
cycle, while Leibowitz (1974) presents evidence on the relative importance of mother’s 
education on the earnings of sons. Heckman and Hotz (1986) examine determinants of wages 
for Panamanian males and find mother's education tends to have a persistently stronger and 
                                                                                                                                                      
providing financial support and encouragements, while maternal influence stems from role 
modeling for children.   
4 This is especially the case for developing countries as the estimated returns to schooling 
are usually high. One might reasonable suspect that omitted variables bias might be larger in 
less developed economies as liquidity constraints and family background are likely to be 
important determinants of both education and earnings (Lam and Schoeni, 1993). 6 
 
more robust effect on earnings than father's education. Strauss and Thomas (1996) and Lam 
and Schoeni (1993) find large effects of parental education on the labor earnings of males in 
Brazil. Strauss and Thomas also show that family background is important for female wages. 
Liu, Hammitt and Lin (2000) estimate a wage equation for Taiwanese and find that the 
effect of father's schooling on wages is larger than the effect of mother's schooling – a 
university-educated father is associated with a 15% wage advantage compared with an 
illiterate father in the private sector. Li and Luo (2004) study the case of China and find that 
father’s education is significant in affecting children’s wages but mother’s education is not 
significant. 
In general, the literature has not paid enough attention towards interpreting the 
partial effects of parental education on one’s wages. Most studies do not even attempt to 
understand these effects, while the few that do cannot offer a definitive answer. For example, 
Liu, Hammitt and Lin (2000) find that the effect of family background are significant in the 
private sector but not in the public sector. They attribute such effects to either family 
connections or unobserved ability, but are not able to differentiate the two. 
A notable exception is the work by Lam and Schoeni (1993, 1994)
5, which finds 
that a Brazilian man's earnings appear to be more strongly influenced by the schooling of 
his father-in-law than his own father. Based on a model of assortative mating and 
intergenerational transmission of schooling and earnings, they interpret the result as 
evidence that parental characteristics are more likely to be serving as proxies for 
                                                 
5  Agnarsson and Carlin (2002) conduct similar analysis in Sweden and find similar results.   7 
 
unobservable worker characteristics rather than as indicators of returns to nepotistic family 
connections in the labor market. 
3 Institutional Backgrounds 
The Chinese labor market has gone through tremendous changes in the last several 
decades. During the pre-reform period (1949-1977), due to the restrictions of the residential 
registration system (“hukou”), labor flows between rural and urban areas and among 
different geographical regions were insignificant. The government guarantees almost full 
employment in the urban areas, primarily through State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs). Within 
a firm, wage differences were small and mainly determined by job positions and seniority. 
Due to the rigidity of the labor allocation system and the power held by authorities, family 
connections (or “guanxi”) are important in getting a good job that pays higher wages and 
better fringe benefits (Bian, 1994). There was also the prevalent practice of “jieban”, which 
entitled a retired worker’s immediate family members, usually the son or daughter, the 
employment opportunity in the same factory or working unit. 
As China started to open its door and implement market-oriented economic reform 
measures in the late 1970s, SOEs gained some freedom in their hiring decisions and were 
allowed to offer more flexible wages. Nevertheless, developments in SOEs lacked 
considerably the burgeoning non-state sectors, which include small proprietorships, 
township-and-village enterprises (TVEs), foreign and privately-owned businesses. 
Non-state firms are less likely to suffer from ambiguous property rights and agency 
problems as SOEs do, thus are more likely to pay their workers according to their marginal 8 
 
productivity. Consequently, returns to human capital are in general higher in the non-state 
sector (Zhao, 2002). Geographically, although all regions have achieved noticeable 
economic developments, the coastal regions as a whole have witnessed higher GDP growth 
rates especially after 1992 when the former leader Deng Xiaoping toured the South of the 
country. At about the same time, the central government has established several Special 
Economic Zones in coastal areas, with more favorable reform policies in terms of attracting 
foreign direct investments and promoting international trade. Overall, the coastal region has 
established more vibrant and competitive labor markets due to both preferential policies and 
geographic advantages (See: Wan, 2007; Benjamin et al., 2008; Fleisher and Chen; 1997; 
and Yang, 2002). In general, while “guanxi”, or family connections, is still a pervasive 
feature of the Chinese society, its importance in the labor market diminished, especially in 
more competitive segments of the economy
6.  
4 Model and Hypotheses 
In this section, we provide a theoretical framework similar to that in Lam and 
Schoeni (1994) and develop several hypotheses under different assumptions. We will use 
the empirical findings to examine the validity of these hypotheses in the last section of the 
paper.  
To start, let the log wage for individual i at time t be denoted as Yit. Suppose we 
observe wages at two time periods: t=0 when he enters the labor market (first job) and t=1 
when the survey is administered (current job). We have   
                                                 
6  Démurger, Fournier, Li and Zhong (2006) provide a detailed summary of urban labor 
market reforms since 1978. 9 
 
(1)                                            , and   
(2)                                              . 
In the above equations, SCHi is person i’s years of schooling, Ai, which we loosely 
refer to as “ability”, represents all dimensions of human capital not captured by formal 
schooling, including one’s innate ability. Ji captures the wage effect of the first job search, 
and      is the error term that represents all other idiosyncratic shocks
7. Current wage 
reflects not only effects of education and ability, but also the effects of wages on the first job. 
Even if an individual has changed jobs, β4 could still be positive as the previous wage 
serves as a benchmark when one conducts further job search (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect the effects to be stronger when the worker stays at 
the same job. 
The following two equations represent orthogonal decompositions of ability and 
job search on one’s education and her parents’ education.   
   (3)                         _           _         
      
   (4)                _           _         
  
Where F_SCHi and M_SCHi are father’s and mother’s years of schooling, respectively.     
     
and    
  are orthogonal residue portions of ability and job search, respectively. The two 
equations implicitly assume that schooling is conditionally orthogonal to search on the first 
                                                 
7  Note that we do not include explicitly a job search term for current wage in equation (2). 
This is because current job search reflects more about one’s own ability and education 
rather than effects of parents, which are the focus of our study. Here, we assume that current 
job search is correlated with ability but not education, so it is then subsumed in the error 
term of the ability equation (3).   10 
 
job, but not ability. 
Substituting (3) and (4) into the wage equations, we have the following reduced 
form equations:     
  (5)                                                                        _      
                 _           
        
        , and 
  (6)                                                     
                                                                  _      
                              _             
         
          
                , 
upon which we develop the comparative statics results:     
Hypothesis H1: In labor markets that value human capital more (with larger β10, β11, β20 and 
β21), both coefficients on SCH for the first job and for the current job will be larger.   
Assumption A1:  γ    γ    and γ    γ   , i.e., father’s education is less correlated with 
children’s ability and more correlated with first job search than mother’s education. 
Hypothesis H2: Under assumption A1, for both first job wage and current job wage, in labor 
markets that value human capital more (which has larger β20 and β21) and/or are less 
monopsonistic (which has smaller β3), the difference between the coefficients on F_SCH 
and M_SCH will decrease (becomes more negative). This is obvious as for first job wage 
the difference in coefficients is                               and for the current wage 
the difference is                                          . 
Hypothesis H3: (1) Under assumption A1, for current wage, it is ambiguous whether the 
difference between the coefficients on F_SCH and M_SCH will be smaller or larger for 11 
 
those who has changed jobs (hence has a smaller value of β4) compared to those who never 
changed jobs. (2) Nevertheless, in labor markets in which first job search is considerably 
more important than ability (   sufficiently  larger  than    ), the difference will be smaller 
(more negative). 
Assumption A2:  γ      γ  , i.e, father’s education is (conditionally) sufficiently more 
correlated with initial job search than with ability.   
Hypothesis H4: Under assumption A2, the coefficient on F_SCH will be smaller in labor 
markets that value human capital more (which has larger β20 and β21) and/or are less 
monopsonistic (which has smaller β3).  
Assumption A3:  γ    γ   , i.e, mother’s education is (conditionally) sufficiently more 
correlated with ability than initial job search.   
Hypothesis H5: Under assumption A3, the coefficient on M_SCH will be larger in labor 
markets that value human capital more (which has larger β20 and β21) and/or are less 
monopsonistic (which has smaller β3). 
5 Data and Sample Statistics 
Our main data source is the 2007 China Urban Household Supplemental Survey on 
Education from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
8. It is conducted by the urban 
survey department of NBS, and is based on the same sampling frames of the regular annual 
Urban Household Survey, to which the research community had limited access
9. The 
                                                 
8 The data can be obtained from the Urban Survey Department, China National Bureau of 
Statistics. 
9 Only data from six provinces in the Urban Household Survey has been available to the 
research community, see Zhang et al. (2005) and Zhang et al. (2008).   12 
 
supplement survey is representative of the nation’s urban population, and includes 5,090 
sampled households in twenty-one provinces
10. Detailed questions about one’s own 
education, her parents’ education, and job-related information are asked in this supplement. 
We first match the supplemental survey to the regular urban household survey, 
which contains basic household and individual demographic information. The supplemental 
survey only collects detailed job history information about one person in a household – the 
head if he or she is employed, otherwise the individual with the highest earnings in the 
household. Matching is not straightforward as the NBS only provides common household 
identifiers but not individual identifiers across the two surveys. Using the information on 
household heads’ employment status, monthly income and other demographic information, 
we were able to match successfully 5,028 individuals. We further restrict the sample to 
workers with at most 32 years of experience by 2007, which corresponds to the cohort who 
started working after 1975 when the Cultural Revolution ended and the Chinese economy 
came back to normal track. We also exclude those with only primary education or less, as 
we will use the type of middle schools attended and performances in middle schools as 
control variables. In the last step we drop all females in the sample, as they are more likely 
to be self-selected as household heads, thus do not represent the female population in 
general. The resulting sample size is 3,153. 
The NBS data is unique in that it asks questions for multiple jobs: current job, 
                                                 
10 There are 31 provinces (including municipalities and autonomous regions) in mainland 
China. The 21 provinces included in the survey are: Tianjin, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Guangdong, Chongqing, Guizhou, Shangxi, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.   13 
 
previous job, and the first job. All sample individuals report wages on current job if they are 
employed. Those who have ever changed jobs also report wages on the immediate previous 
job. If the previous job is not the first job ever hold, she also answers questions about the 
first job. In this paper, we transform all wages to constant 2006 RMB values, and create two 
separate samples in order to run two wage regressions
11. Detailed procedures for 
constructing these variables are included in the appendix of the paper. 
Summary statistics for the NBS current job sample are shown in Panel A of Table 1. 
Sample individuals on average have 11.4 years of schooling, and 18.5 years of work 
experience. The average number of years of schooling for fathers and mothers are 8.4 and 
6.2 years, respectively. 23% of the individuals attended a key middle school
12, and 43% 
self-reported that they either performed “very good” or “good” in middle school. 
Sample size for the NBS first job sample is 676 (Panel B of Table 1), which is 
considerably less than the current job sample. Not surprisingly, the education variables all 
have similar values to those in the current job sample. Mean log wage rate is only 0.81, 
which is substantially less than for the current job, reflecting the phenomenal real wage 
growths in the past several decades in China. 32% of the sample reports graduating from 
high school in the coast regions. 
Our second data source is the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 2002 
                                                 
11  Suppose a person has held only one job, then we only have one wage observation which 
is the current wage. The survey does not ask the wages earned when the person first started 
the job. 
12 Compared to other middle schools, a “key” school in China usually has better facilities 
and teachers, and admits better students on average.   14 
 
urban survey
13. The CHIP dataset is also nationally representative and has been widely used 
in the literature as it is more accessible to the research community compared to NBS 
datasets (Li and Luo, 2004; Fleisher et. al., 2004). It includes 6,835 households and contains 
personal employment and wage information
14. One advantage of the CHIP data is that it has 
the employer’s ownership status (state owned, private owned or foreign owned, etc.), which 
allow us to examine whether returns to one’s education and her parents’ education differ by 
firm ownership. 
We start with household heads and their spouses in the CHIP data as questions 
about parental education are only directly asked for those people. To make the sample 
comparable to the NBS data, we drop all females and only include those with at least some 
secondary education, and aged between 22 to 52 years old
15. The resulting sample has 1,159 
men, and the summary statistics are shown in Panel C of Table 1. Note that log real hourly 
wage is only 1.7, which is much lower than 1.98 in the NBS current job sample. This is 
because CHIP wage is for the year 2002, while NBS current job wages are for the year 2007. 
The implied rate of annual increase for wage rate is about 7%. The CHIP sample also has 
lower levels of parental education as they represent an older cohort than the NBS sample, 
but it shows a slightly higher level of average own schooling. We are not sure why these 
discrepancies arise but it is likely that NBS and CHIP have systematic differences in term of 
survey designs and/or data collection. Thus it is only prudent to use both and show that 
                                                 
13   Data downloaded through ICPSR, website: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/21741.xml. 
14  See Khan and Riskin (2005) for a detailed description of the data. 
15 Our  main  results  are  robust  to  alternative  age  range  restrictions.          15 
 
results are robust.   
6 Main Results   
6.1 NBS Current Job and CHIP samples   
Table 2 presents OLS results of the wage regressions on current jobs based on the 
NBS and CHIP samples. The dependent variable in the regressions is log hourly wage rate 
on current job, and the explanatory variables include one’s education (SCH), parental 
education (F_SCH and M_SCH), work experience (EXP) and its square divided by 100 
(EXP2), self-rated performance in middle school (RANK), a dummy indicating whether 
attended a key middle school or not (SQ), the interaction term of RANK and SQ, city and 
industry dummies.
16  The first three columns of Table 2 report results using the NBS current 
job sample and the last three columns show the CHIP sample estimates. 
Baseline Results   
Columns (1) and (4) show the baseline results in the NBS Current Job and CHIP 
sample, respectively. Based on the NBS Current Job sample, wage return to one more year 
of schooling is 6.1%, controlling for city and industry effects. The wage-experience profile 
shows a normal inverted U-shape, with wages increasing by around 10% in the first six 
years after labor market entry and reach the maximum at 18 years of general experience. 
These estimates are broadly in line with other findings in the literature. For example, Yang 
(2005) estimates returns to schooling of 3.1% and 5.1% in 1988 and 1995, respectively, 
using CHIP data. Zhang et al. (2005) estimate returns to education to be 7.5% for urban 
                                                 
16  Regression results not including city and industry dummies, available upon request from 
the authors, are similar to what was reported in this paper. 16 
 
males in 2001 based on NBS data. 
Schooling levels of both parents are positively correlated with their son’s wage. 
One additional year of father’s education increases son’s wage by 1.1%, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. To put the number in perspective, comparing two 
otherwise identical individuals with one’s father college-educated (16 years of schooling) 
and the other’s father illiterate (zero years of schooling), the son of the college-educated 
father enjoys a 17.6% wage advantage - almost equal to the returns to three years’ additional 
schooling on his own. In contrast, return to mother’s education is statistically insignificant. 
Compared with the NBS dataset, the CHIP data show a lower return to one’s 
education at 4.7% as shown in Column (4). Considering that individuals in both samples are 
on average 41 years old and the CHIP data was collected about 5 years before the NBS data, 
the lower returns to education suggest that returns to schooling has increased for the 
younger cohort, which is consistent with the literature. Returns to father’s education and 
mother’s education are 0.4% and 0.3%, respectively. Thus, although the return to mother’s 
education was similar in CHIP and NBS datasets, wage return to father’s schooling is much 
lower in CHIP. 
Job Changers vs. Stayers 
In column (2) of Table 2, we include a dummy indicating whether one has changed 
job or not and its interactions with the schooling variables. Compared to those who never 
changed job, those who did on average suffer a wage penalty of about 17%. Noticeably, 
returns to father’s education are quite different for stayers and changers. Wages are higher 17 
 
by 1.5% for each additional year of father’s schooling if the individual never changed job, 
which is also statistically significant at 1% level, but only 0.4% for those who has switched 
jobs. Clearly, job changes are endogenous. But given that return to father’s education is only 
substantial for those who never change jobs, it is possible that father’s education affect 
one’s wage on current job primarily through his first job.   
State vs. Non-state Sectors 
Column (5) of Table 2 presents results that interact a State-Owned-Enterprises 
(SOEs) dummy and the education variables, using the CHIP sample. Workers in SOEs enjoy 
a 48% wage premium over their counterparts in non-state sectors. However, return to 
schooling is substantially lower in SOEs than in the non-state sector, with a difference of 
3.7%, which is significant at the 1% level (Similar findings are also reported by Zhao, 2002). 
In addition, return to father’s education is 2.0% higher in the state sector than in the 
non-state sector, while return to mother’s education is 1.7% lower. Both of these differences 
are statistically significant. 
Coast vs. Non-coast Regions 
We then interact a coast dummy with education variables and report the results in 
columns (3) and (6), using NBS and CHIP samples, respectively
17. The results from both 
datasets show similar patterns. Average wage and return to one’s schooling are higher in the 
more developed coastal areas than in non-coast provinces. In the NBS sample, return to 
father’s education is significantly lower by 1.6% in the coast regions; the same sign is 
                                                 
17  In the NBS sample, coast provinces include Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Zhejiang, In the CHIP sample, coast provinces include Beijing, Guangdong and Jiangsu.   18 
 
shown in the CHIP sample although not statistically significant. Return to mother’s 
education is higher by 0.4% in coastal regions in both samples, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
6.2 NBS First Job Sample 
The results about those who have never changed job and those who have in the 
previous subsection suggest that the impact of father’s education on wages may be one-shot 
which happen early in one’s career. To explore this supposition in more detail, we analyze 
the NBS First Job sample. The results are shown in Table 3. Although we do not have first 
job wages for those who never changed job, and our analyses here are based on a 
self-selected sample, the comparative statics results should still hold. 
Baseline Results 
Columns (1) of Table 3 presents the regression results for the same models estimated 
in Table 2, except that the dependent variable now is one’s wage on the first job. By 
definition, work experiences are all set to zero. As we don’t know where individuals had 
their first job, only industry dummies are included. For one additional year of schooling, the 
wage of the first job increases by about 2.5%. Thus return to schooling is substantially 
lower for the first job than for the current job as shown in Table 2. Schooling levels of both 
parents have a substantial effect on first job wage, with returns to father’s and mother’s 
education at 2.8% and 2.5%, respectively.   
Coast vs. Non-coast Regions 
To examine how parental education affects wages on the first job in different 19 
 
markets, we compare coast with non-coast regions. Due to lack of information, we use the 
province where a person attended high school to proxy for the place where he had his first 
job. Biases from misclassification of coast/non-coast status are likely to be small, as only 
3.7% of the sample has ever moved between non-coast and coast areas since high school 
graduation. Alternatively, we also tried to use current residency as a proxy for areas with the 
first job, and the results are almost the same. 
Column (2) of Table 3 reports the results. Return to schooling is 6.0% higher in 
coastal areas than in non-coast areas, suggesting that coastal labor markets value human 
capital more. Interestingly, father’s education has a significantly smaller impact on first job 
wages in coastal areas, by 5.5%, than in non-coast areas. The difference is also statistically 
significant at 10% level. On the contrary, mother’s education has a larger effect on first job 
wage in coastal areas, by 4.2%, than in non-coast areas.   
Different Reform Periods 
NBS First Job sample also contains information about the year one started to work, 
allowing us to compare effects of parental education on different cohorts who started their 
first jobs in different time periods: the pre-reform era (before 1978), early-reform era 
(1978-1992), and the most recently period (post 1992) which corresponds to deepening of 
reform and open door policy. 
We interact time dummies (the default group is the before-1978 period) with the 
education variables and present the results in columns (3) of Table 3. Consistent with other 
studies that report increasing returns to schooling in China (Fleisher et al., 2004, Zhang et 20 
 
al., 2005, and Yang, 2005), we find that return to education increased rapidly, especially 
after 1992. One additional year of schooling is only associated with less than 1% increase of 
wage before the 1990s, but raises one’s wage by 4.1% in the post-1992 period. 
In addition, we observe that in terms of first job wages, return to father’s education 
declines significantly over time, but return to mother’s education shows a different pattern. 
In the pre-1978 period, return to father’s education was as high as 15.2%. It decreased to a 
meager 1.3% for the period between 1978 and 1992, as the economic reform took off, and 
declined further to 0.8% for the post-1992 period. On the other hand, return to mother’s 
education increased from a negative but insignificant -3.3% in the pre-1978 period to 2.6% 
in the 1978-1992 period, and then to 4% for the post-1992 period. The opposite movements 
of returns to father’s and mother’s education suggest that they must affect children’s wages 
through quite different mechanisms. 
6.3 Robustness Checks 
Possible self-selection into different sectors or geographic regions 
Strictly speaking, our comparative statics results hold only if workers are randomly 
assigned to different labor markets conditional on observables included in the regressions. 
This condition holds with respect to the time dimension, as the overall process of labor 
market liberalization is exogenous to individual behavior, and different cohorts of workers 
are subject to different labor markets. However, self-selection might contaminate our results 
in terms of comparisons between state and non-state sectors, as well as coast and non-coast 
regions.  21 
 
If workers self-select into state/non-state sectors or coast/non-coast regions based on 
some unobserved characteristics not related to parental education, then our OLS estimates 
are still consistent. Although a priori we have no reason to expect the interaction terms of 
parental education with these sector and region categories to be biased, we perform two 
stage least squares (2SLS) estimates as robustness checks as shown in Table 4. In general, 
these results are qualitatively similar to the OLS results and support our general hypotheses.   
We use information on people’s migration history as instruments for coast/non-coast 
status. Column (1) of Table 4 presents IV results for the NBS Current Job sample. The 
corresponding OLS results are listed in column (3) of Table 2. Based on the IV estimates, 
return to schooling and return to mother’s schooling are 7.2% and 2.4% higher in coastal 
areas than in non-coastal areas, but return to father’s education is lower by 1.9%. These 
estimates are of the same sign but slightly larger magnitudes than corresponding OLS 
estimates. Similarly, for CHIP sample IV results reported in column (3), return to father’s 
education are lower by 7.9% in coastal areas, but returns to one’s own education and 
mother’s education are both higher. Compared to the corresponding OLS results in column 
(6) of Table 2, the signs of these interaction terms are the same but the magnitudes are even 
larger using the IV method. 
Column (2) of Table 4 report results that instrument state/non-state sector choice by 
whether jobs are assigned by government (which also includes “jieban”) using the CHIP 
sample. Not surprisingly, if one obtains his job through government or “jieban” practice, 
then he is much more likely to be in working in a state-owned-enterprise. Based on the IV 22 
 
estimates, return to schooling and return to mother’s schooling are lower in the state sector 
by 8.1% and 3.5%, respectively. However, return to father’s schooling is higher by 3.9% in 
the state sector compared with non-state sector. These results again are consistent with the 
OLS results reported in column (5) of Table 2, with even more pronounced effects. 
Measurement Errors 
Schooling variables in both NBS and CHIP data unavoidably contain some 
measurement errors, especially when we convert degree categories to years of schooling for 
parents. Nevertheless, in most cases, measurement errors attenuate parameter estimates 
towards zero and inflate the estimated variance. Thus our parameter estimates would be 
even larger and statistically more significant if there were no measurement errors. 
We also run median regressions which are more robust to outliers. The results are 
reported in Tables 5 and 6. Again these results are very close to the OLS results and suggest 
that our main findings are unlikely to be invalidated by possible data errors.   
7 Discussions and Conclusions 
Using NBS and CHIP data, we examine the partial correlations of parental education 
with adult children’s wages in China. We find that although schooling levels of both parents 
are positively associated with children’s wages, the effects change quite differently in 
different settings. The effect of father’s education tends to be substantial only for those who 
never changed jobs, and is larger in earlier time periods, in non-coast areas and in the state 
sector. In contrast, mother’s education has a larger effect in coast areas and in non-state 
sectors.  23 
 
We summarize our theoretical predictions from section three and empirical findings 
discussed in the previous section in table 7. The first three hypotheses (H1-H3) that are 
either derived from the model only, or used the additional assumption A1, have received 
very strong empirical support. Moreover, for hypothesis H4 that is based on much stronger 
assumptions A2, which states that father’s education is sufficiently more correlated with 
initial job search than ability, the empirical evidence are also quite supportive. Hypothesis 
H5, which based on the assumption (A3) that mother’s education is sufficiently more 
correlated with ability than first job search, has only receive mild support with most 
estimated coefficients not statistically significant. 
Overall, our theoretical model and assumptions picture a consistent story - parental 
schoolings influence children’s wages through very different mechanisms. While mother’s 
education primarily captures unmeasured ability of children, father’s education indicates 
family connections that help the children to find a better paying first job
18.  
In many wage regressions, parental levels of schooling are used as instrumental 
variables for one’s own education (For a recent example for China, see Giles, Park and 
Wang, 2008). Our study indicates that the biases from such IV estimators are likely to be 
context dependent and warrant careful interpretation. Similar to OLS estimates of return to 
education, IV estimates using either father’s or mother’s education are likely to be upward 
biased. But a priori the magnitude of biases from different estimators are hard to tell. In 
particular, if one uses father’s education as the IV, then the bias might be particularly large 
                                                 
18  Knight and Yueh (2008) provide direct evidence of social network on income for urban 
workers in China. 24 
 
for people who have just entered the labor market, especially in a developing country like 
China.  
As a final note, we are not necessarily interpreting our results in a causal sense. 
Mothers of higher ability could both have more education themselves and produce (due to 
either heredity or better parenting) more able children who earn higher wages in labor 
market
19. Similarly, higher schooling of fathers does not translate directly into better first 
jobs for children. Future research should study the mechanisms of how fathers (or rather, 
the whole family) help with children to locate their first job. This will shed further light on 
issues such as intergenerational earnings mobility and labor market nepotism, especially in 
less developed countries.     
                                                 
19 Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) and Plug (2004) argue that an increase in the 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Name  Variable Definition 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
        NBS current job NBS  first  job CHIP 
LNW  Log hourly wage (in 2006 RMB)  1.98  0.82  0.81  1.23  1.70  0.64 
SCH  total  years  of  schooling  11.40 2.60 11.04 2.41 12.34 2.20 
F_SCH  Father's  total  years  of  schooling  8.37 4.23 7.81 4.19 7.85 4.40 
M_SCH  Mother's total years of schooling  6.24  4.50  5.61  4.31  5.13  4.46 
EXP  Years  of  work  experience  18.49 7.68 20.61 6.52 18.24 5.58 
RANK  A dummy that equals 1 if self-reported performance is the middle school is very good or good, 
0 otherwise 
0.43 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.54 0.50 
SQ  A dummy that equals 1 if attend a key middel school, 0 otherwise.  0.23  0.42  0.19  0.39  0.36  0.48 
CHG_JOB  A dummy that equals 1 if the current job is not the first job, 0 otherwise.  0.32  0.47         
COAST  A dummy that equals 1 if currently lives in a coastal province, or studied in a high school in the 
coast area (in the NBS first job sample), 0 otherwise 
0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44 
MIG_C  A dummy that equals 1 if migrate to current city from a coastal area, 0 otherwise  0.06  0.24         
MIG_NC  A dummy that equals 1 if migrate to current city from a noncoastal area, 0 otherwise  0.21  0.40         
T78-92  A dummy that equals 1 if started first job between 1978 to 1992, 0 otherwise.        0.70  0.46     
POST-92  A dummy that equals 1 if started first job after 1992, 0 otherwise.        0.18  0.39     
STATE  A dummy that equals 1 if working in a State-Owned-Enterprise, 0 otherwise          0.63  0.48 
JOB_ARR  A dummy that equals 1 if the current job obtained through government arrangement or 
retirement of parents, 0 otherwise 
     0.59  0.49 
MIG  A dummy that equals 1 if individual migrated to current residential city, 0 otherwise          0.23  0.42 
MIG_YR  Number of years since migrating to current city                 5.25 10.18 
 
Note: Sample sizes for the NBS current job, NBS first job, and CHIP samples are 3153, 676, and 1159, respectively.31 
 
Table 2: OLS Wage Regressions, NBS Current Job and CHIP. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    NBS current job CHIP 
SCH  0.061*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.070*** 0.045*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
F_SCH  0.011***  0.015***  0.014***  0.004   -0.010   0.000  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
M_SCH  0.003   0.000   0.001   0.003   0.015*  0.011* 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
EXP  0.019***  0.024***  0.021***  0.009   0.008   0.013   
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
EXP2  -0.054***  -0.061***  -0.051**  -0.015   -0.015   -0.013   
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) 
SCH*CHG_JOB   0.006           
   (0.011)         
F_SCH*CHG_JOB   -0.011          
   (0.008)         
M_SCH*CHG_JOB   0.007           
   (0.007)         
CHG_JOB   -0.171           
   (0.127)         
SCH*STATE         -0.037**   
         (0.015)   
F_SCH*STATE         0.020*   
         (0.010)   
M_SCH*STATE         -0.017*   
         (0.010)   
STATE         0.475**   
         (0.191)   
SCH*COAST     0.048***      0.029   
     (0.010)      (0.018) 
F_SCH*COAST     -0.016**      -0.001   
     (0.008)      (0.012) 
M_SCH*COAST      0.004       0.004  
     (0.007)      (0.012) 
COAST      0.057       0.107  
     (0.122)      (0.236) 
Constant  1.283***  1.274***  1.047***  0.649   0.316   1.454*** 
   (0.134)  (0.139)  (0.141)  (0.527) (0.533) (0.226) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City dummies  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.28  0.28  0.22  0.30   0.30   0.20  
 
Note: Dependent Variable is LNW. Other explanatory variables included are RANK, SQ and 
their interaction term. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** stands for 
statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level.   32 
 
Table 3: OLS Wage Regressions, NBS First Job.   
 
    (1) (2) (3) 
SCH  0.025 0.005 0.002 
  (0.022) (0.025) (0.077) 
F_SCH 0.028**  0.042***  0.152*** 
  (0.013) (0.016) (0.043) 
M_SCH 0.025*  0.01  -0.033 
  (0.013) (0.016) (0.038) 
SCH*COAST   0.06   
   (0.041)   
F_SCH*COAST   -0.055*   
   (0.029)   
M_SCH*COAST   0.042   
   (0.028)   
COAST   -0.223   
   (0.452)   
SCH*T78-92    0.003 
    (0.081) 
M_SCH*T78-92    0.059 
    (0.042) 
F_SCH*T78-92    -0.139*** 
    (0.046) 
T78-92    0.595 
    (0.911) 
SCH*POST-92    0.039 
    (0.084) 
M_SCH*POST-92    0.073 
    (0.046) 
F_SCH*POST-92    -0.144*** 
    (0.050) 
POST-92    0.65 
    (0.943) 
Constant -0.552*  -0.486  -0.852 
  (0.304) (0.337) (0.881) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.09  0.1  0.12 
 
Note: Dependent Variable is LNW. Other explanatory variables included are EXP, EXP2, 
RANK, SQ and the interaction term of RANK and SQ. Robust standard errors are reported 




Table 4: IV Wage Regressions 
 
   (1) (2) (3)
    NBS current job CHIP CHIP 
Second stage regression 
SCH  0.043*** 0.111*** 0.03 
  (0.013) (0.024) (0.021) 
F_SCH 0.015*  -0.025*  0.019 
  (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) 
M_SCH -0.009  0.037**  0.001 









SCH*COAST 0.072**  0.089 
 (0.031)  (0.068) 
F_SCH*COAST -0.019  -0.079* 
 (0.021)  (0.047) 
M_SCH*COAST 0.024  0.042 
 (0.020)  (0.046) 
COAST -0.391  -0.278 
 (0.388)  (0.927) 
First stage regression       
JOB_ARR   0.364***   
   (0.027)   
MIG    0.204** 
    (0.090) 
MIG_YR    -0.009** 
    (0.004) 
MIC_C 0.382***     
 (0.035)     
MIC_NC -0.252***     
 (0.020)     
F-stat for joint significance of all IVs  158.7   184.2   3.4  
p-value  0.000   0.000   0.035  
 
Note: Dependent Variable is LNW. Other explanatory variables included are EXP, EXP2, 
RANK, SQ and the interaction term of RANK and SQ. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. *** stands for statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 
10% level. 
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Table 5: Median Wage Regressions, NBS Current Job and CHIP. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    NBS current job CHIP 
SCH  0.059*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.044*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) 
F_SCH  0.008**  0.009**  0.014***  -0.002   -0.013   -0.007  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) 
M_SCH  0.006   0.002   -0.002   0.016**  0.038***  0.015*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
EXP  0.025***  0.032***  0.026***  0.026   0.033**  0.017  
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) 
EXP2  -0.065***  -0.076***  -0.063***  -0.039   -0.064   -0.023  
 (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.062) (0.047) (0.044) 
SCH*CHG_JOB   0.020**      
   (0.009)      
F_SCH*CHG_JOB   -0.004        
   (0.007)      
M_SCH*CHG_JOB   0.008        
   (0.006)      
CHG_JOB   -0.422***      
   (0.107)      
SCH*STATE         -0.035**   
         (0.018)   
F_SCH*STATE         0.014     
         (0.011)   
M_SCH*STATE         -0.032***   
         (0.011)   
STATE         0.652***   
         (0.216)   
SCH*COAST    0.050***    0.015   
    (0.010)    (0.019) 
F_SCH*COAST    -0.020***    0.010   
    (0.008)    (0.012) 
M_SCH*COAST    0.006      0.006   
    (0.007)    (0.011) 
COAST    -0.033      0.214   
    (0.116)    (0.235) 
Constant  1.328*** 1.308*** 1.176*** 1.286*** 0.907*** 1.529*** 
 (0.150)  (0.120)  (0.133)  (0.422) (0.345) (0.313) 
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City dummies  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
 
Note: Same as in Table 2.   35 
 
Table 6: Median Wage Regressions, NBS First Job.   
 
    (1) (2) (3) 
SCH  0.030   -0.003   -0.023  
  (0.036) (0.032) (0.092) 
F_SCH  0.021   0.024   0.160*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.054) 
M_SCH  0.026   0.014   -0.011  
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.052) 
SCH*COAST   0.075     
   (0.054)   
F_SCH*COAST   -0.009     
   (0.037)   
M_SCH*COAST   0.022     
   (0.036)   
COAST   -0.769     
   (0.580)   
SCH*T78-92    0.037   
    (0.098) 
M_SCH*T78-92    0.046   
    (0.056) 
F_SCH*T78-92    -0.161*** 
    (0.057) 
T78-92    0.663   
    (1.037) 
SCH*POST-92    0.111   
    (0.110) 
M_SCH*POST-92   0.019   
    (0.069) 
F_SCH*POST-92   -0.133* 
    (0.070) 
POST-92    0.153   
    (1.181) 
Constant -0.405    -0.055   -0.677  
  (0.461) (0.395) (0.995) 
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Same as in Table 3.   36 
 
Table 7: Comparing Theoretical Predictions with Empirical Results 
 
Theoretical Predictions  Empirical Results 
Assumption    Hypothesis  Coefficient(s)  Comparison (predicted sign)  O L S       
Estimates 
I V        
Estimates 
Median 
Regression  Sample 
None H1  Coef(SCH) 
coast vs. non-coast (+) 
4.7%*** 7.2%**  5.0%***  NBS  current  job 
2.9% 8.9%  1.5%  CHIP   
6.0%      7.5%  NBS first job 
1978-1992 vs. pre 1978 (+)  0.3%      3.7%  NBS first job 
post 1992 vs. 1978-1992 (+)  3.6%      7.4%  NBS first job 
non-state vs. state (+)  3.7%**  8.1%**  3.5%  CHIP   
A1   
H2 Coef(F_SCH)-Coef(M_SCH) 
coast vs. non-coast (-) 
-1.2% -4.3% -2.6%** NBS  current  job 
-0.5% -12.1%  4.0%  CHIP   
-9.7%**      -2.9%  NBS first job 
1978-1992 vs. pre 1978 (-)  -19.0%***      -20.7%***  NBS first job 
post 1992 vs. 1978-1992 (-)  -3.0%      5.5%  NBS first job 
non-state vs. state (-)  -37.0%**  -7.4%**  -4.6%***  CHIP   
H3 Coef(F_SCH)-Coef(M_SCH)  changed vs. never changed job 
(ambiguous, possibly -)  -1.8%     -1.2% NBS  current  job 
A2 H4  Coef(F_SCH)   
coast vs. non-coast (-) 
-1.6%** -1.9%    -2.0%***  NBS  current  job 
-5.5%* -7.9%*  1.0%  CHIP   
-0.1%      -0.9%  NBS first job 
1978-1992 vs. pre 1978 (-)  -14.0%***      -16.1%***  NBS first job 
post 1992 vs. 1978-1992 (-)  -0.5%      2.8%  NBS first job 
non-state vs. state (-)  -2.0%*  -3.9%*  -1.4%  CHIP   
A3 H5  Coef(M_SCH) 
coast vs. non-coast (+) 
0.4% 2.4%  0.6%  NBS  current  job 
4.2% 4.2%  0.6%  CHIP   
0.4%      2.2%  NBS first job 
1978-1992 vs. pre 1978 (+)  5.9%      4.6%  NBS first job 
post 1992 vs. 1978-1992 (+)  1.4%      -2.7%  NBS first job 
non-state vs. state (+)  1.7%*  3.5%*  3.2%***  CHIP   37 
 
 
Note: Empirical results based on the same estimation results reported in Tables 2-6. *** stands for statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 
5% level, and * at 10% level.   38 
 
Appendix: Construction of Main Variables 
Wages – In both NBS and CHIP, hourly wage rate is used as the dependent variable. We 
divide annual earnings (including regular wages, bonuses and other kinds of subsidies) by 
total hours worked in the year, where total hours worked equal the multiple of hours worked 
per day, days worked per week, and number of weeks worked in the year. Because NBS 
does not ask actual total number of weeks worked in the year, we assume it to be 50 for all 
employed individuals. Using annual earnings instead of hourly wage rates does not change 
our results qualitatively. To make wages comparable across time, we also deflate hourly 
wages using the urban consumption price index published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics. Price indices are obtained from various China statistical yearbooks and NBS 
publications. We also exclude the top and bottom one percent of the wages in the 
distribution to minimize the effect of outliers.   
Work experience – We measure an individual’s work experience in NBS by deduct the 
starting year of the first job from 2007, the year the survey is conducted. CHIP asks 
respondents to report their years of work experience directly.     
Years of Schooling – Individual’s years of schooling are directly reported in both datasets. 
However, schooling levels of fathers and mothers are reported as degree categories, but 
converted to years of schooling to be used in all our analyses. For example, we assign 16 
years of schooling to those who have a college’s degree. 
Self-reported rank in middle school and school quality – Rank in school is reported in five 
categories: “very good”, “good”, “average”, “below average” and “bad”. We define the rank 
variable as a dummy that equals to 1 if the individual reports his performance to be either 
“very good” or “good”, 0 otherwise. Another dummy is constructed to indicate whether the 
person attended a key middle school or not. Both variables are used as controls of personal 
innate ability and quality of secondary education in the wage regressions.   